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ABSTRACT
The Internet plays a growing role in the economy. This paper extrapo-
lates this trend and analyses a world where most transactions take place in
"cyberspace". We ask the following question: how does the design of the
search engine aﬀect the incentives to innovate and the economy’s long run
growth rate? This is done in the context of a "qualitative" model where
growth occurs because the number of varieties grows and consumers select a
shrinking fraction of the available goods, of growing quality. They must use
a search engine to locate goods. The search engine aﬀects the market size of
a good over its life cycle, and thus the incentives to innovate. Its structure
has two conflicting eﬀects. A visibility eﬀect by which a greater hit score
increases market size. A selection eﬀect by which consumers are more picky
and select higher quality goods, thus reducing the life span of any given good.
While these two eﬀects on growth cancel out for simple specifications,
that is no longer the case if a firm’s score is variable along its life cycle or if
he search process uses resources.
It is shown that the discount eﬀect of gradual recognition of popularity
tends to reduce growth. Hence, growth is enhanced if the search engine is less
sensitive to popularity. Also, growth is lower when the search engine rewards
"web page quality" better because of the resources diverted away from R
and D into advertising. But these mechanisms generate opposite level eﬀects
on the average quality selected by consumers. As a result the net eﬀect on
welfare is ambiguous.
Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Search Engines, Selection, Quality Lad-
ders, Advertising, Internet, R and D
JEL: O3
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1 Introduction
The Internet plays a growing role in the economy. This paper extrapolates
this trend and analyses a world where most transactions take place in "cy-
berspace". One key diﬀerence between "cyberspace" and the "real world" is
the role of search engines. There is ample anecdotal evidence that changes
in the algorithm of Google, for example, has substantial influence on the fate
of businesses.
Here we take a macroeconomic perspective and ask the following question:
how does the design of the search engine aﬀect the incentives to innovate and
the economy’s long run growth rate?
This is done in the context of a "qualitative" growth model in which there
are physical limits to the number of goods that can be produced (there is
no physical productivity growth) and consumed (one can only consume 0 or
1 unit of each good), but goods diﬀer in their quality and the introduction
of new blueprints, by increasing the total number of available goods, allows
consumers to select higher quality goods. If the distribution of quality lev-
els is unbounded, horizontal innovation may lead to sustained qualitative
growth. That assumption is meant to capture a modern feature of the "new
economy": given that it is pointless to buy the same CD, videogame, etc,
twice and given that there consuming these goods is time intensive, the only
scope for growth is indeed an improvement in their quality. In the model,
existing goods cannot raise their quality and growth is associated with "cre-
ative destruction" in that at some point consumers stop buying a good as
they switch to higher quality products.
In the model, consumers must use a search engine to locate goods, and
then consume a subset of the goods that have been eﬀectively located. The
search engine has a specific design which at any time relates the "score" of
a good — the probability that it is located — to the good’s characteristics,
which may consist of its vintage, its quality, and how much it has invested
in its web page. The search engine therefore crucially aﬀects the market size
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of a good over its life cycle, which in turn determines its present value and
thus the incentives to innovate. I show that the search engine has two major
conflicting eﬀects on the incentives to innovate. A visibility eﬀect which
simply means that a greater score increases one’s market size and therefore
the returns to innovation. A selection eﬀect which means that when more
goods are located, consumers are more picky and select higher quality goods.
As a result an improvement in the performance of the search engine increases
the market size of a good but reduces its life span.
The net eﬀect on growth of the search engine’s performance thus depends
on the relative size of these two eﬀects. Under our assumption of an expo-
nential quality distribution, in many cases these two eﬀects exactly cancel
each other, implying that the overall quality of the search engine has no eﬀect
on growth, but does increase welfare by allowing consumers to select better
goods — a level eﬀect, not a growth eﬀect.
There are circumstances under which one departs from that neutrality
result. In particular:
• A firm’s score is variable along its life cycle. These variations alter the
firm’s value and therefore the visibility eﬀect in a discounted fashion,
whereas the selection eﬀect is determined by the cross-sectional distrib-
ution of scores at a point in time and does not involve such discounting.
This discrepancy introduces non neutralities. We analyse such non neu-
tralities in the "popularity" version of the model (section 4), where the
search engine rewards product quality indirectly through its observed
popularity among consumers. Because of this indirect channel, a firm’s
score gradually improves over time.
• The search process needs resources. This is so in the "advertising"
version of the model (section 5) where there is a sunk investment in
"web page quality" which increases a firm’s score. The search engine
aﬀects the resources used for such advertising, which in turn has an
impact on what is left for alternative uses, including R and D. As a
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result total growth is aﬀected.
In the popularity model, the discount eﬀect of gradual recognition of
popularity tends to reduce growth. Therefore, growth is enhanced if the
search engine is less sensitive to popularity. This conclusion does not apply
to welfare, as a reduction in the engine’s sensitivity to popularity forces
consumers to be less selective — but that is a level eﬀect and not a growth
eﬀect.
In the advertising model, the resource eﬀect generates a negative trade-
oﬀ between advertising and growth; as a result growth is lower when the
search engine rewards "web page quality" better. But that feature again has
a positive level eﬀect on welfare since higher quality goods invest more in
their web page quality — because they expect to stay longer in business and
therefore reap the benefits over a longer time period — which helps consumers
select higher quality goods.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first one to recognize that search en-
gines will have macroeconomic significance and to accordingly embody them
in a growth model. The closest equivalents in the existing literature are
papers that embody search and matching frictions in the labor market in
endogenous growth models, but these papers are not concerned with search
frictions in finding the best possible variety, nor with the eﬀect of the char-
acteristics of the search technology on growth and welfare. See Aghion and
Howitt (1994), Laing et al. (1995), Moreno-Galbis (2004), Chen et al. (1999),
Postel-Vinay (1998). Most of the existing (small) literature on search engines
is in IO and is concerned with their eﬀect on competition, as in Gandal (2001),
Pollock (2008), White (2008), and Ellison and Fisher Ellison (2004).
2 A simple model of growth through selec-
tion
I now describe the simple endogenous growth model on which the analysis
is based. While this model has the unusual feature that the only source
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of growth is the consumer’s ability to become more selective as the range
of available goods increase, this can be viewed as a special case of a model
of creative destruction with quality ladders in the fashion of Aghion and
Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), where varieties are perfect
substitutes but one can only consume one unit of each good1.
The economy is populated by L individuals, each endowed with one unit
of labor and an equal claim on profits. At each date t there is a continuum
of goods available for consumption. The total mass of goods is Nt. Goods
diﬀer by their quality q. The quality distribution is invariant over time and
given by the c.d.f.
F (q) = 1− e−λq; (1)
the corresponding density is therefore
f(q) = λe−λq. (2)
As is standard in the literature, goods are introduced by innovators.
While there is no intellectual property, the original innovator has a trade
secret which allows it to produce the good at a unit cost equal to 1 in terms
of labor. Competitors can only produce it at a cost of p units of labor, with
p > 1. Accordingly, I assume limit pricing. Normalizing the wage to 1, this
implies that all goods will be charged at price p.
For each available good, consumers can consume either one or zero units.
They get a utility flow equal to the quality of the good q. Their total flow of
utility at t is
Ut =
Z +∞
0
ω(q)gt(q)dq,
where gt(.) is the local mass of goods of quality q being consumed, which can
never exceed Ntf(q), and ω() is an increasing function.
At each date t a research sector produces new goods. One unit of labor
employed in the research sector produces γNt new blueprints per unit of
1Models of endogenous growth with indivisibilities and non homothetic preferences
include Matsuyama (2001), Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006), and Saint-Paul (2006).
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time. When a new good is introduced, its quality is drawn randomly from
the distribution f().
At date t we denote by Ct the total quantity of goods being consumed.
Each representative individual then consumes Ct/L goods. Since one unit
of each good is consumed, and all goods have the same price while higher
quality goods generate higher utility, consumers will consume one unit of all
the available goods above some quality threshold q∗t which satisfies
Ct
L
= Nt(1− F (q∗t )). (3)
This yields a utility flow equal to
Ut = Nt
Z +∞
q∗t
ω(q)f(q)dq. (4)
Because of unit prodductivity, the total labor force devoted to production
at date t is Ct.We assume that the labor market clears, so that L−Ct people
must be working in the research sector, implying that
N˙t = γNt(L− Ct). (5)
In what follows I confine the analysis to balanced growth path where Nt
grows at a constant rate and therefore Ct is constant through time. As long
as the growth rate of N is strictly positive, it must be that q∗t grows with time
and tends to infinity so that the RHS of (3) stays constant. Consequently,
each good of quality q eventually becomes obsolete at a critical date T (q)
such that q∗T (q) = q. After this critical date consumers no longer consume
that good as they can spend all their money on higher quality goods.
At t, a newly invented good of quality q will actually be produced provided
q > q∗t ; otherwise it is immediately obsolete. Denoting by r the exogenous
real interest rate, the PDV of inventing a new good at t can then be computed
as
Vt =
ÃZ +∞
q∗t
f(q)
Z T (q)
t
e−r(u−t)du
!
(p− 1)L. (6)
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As long as the good is not obsolete, all consumers purchase one unit of it,
yielding a profit flow to the firm equal to (p− 1)L.
In equilibrium, the value of introducing a new good at t must be equal
to its cost:
Vt =
1
γNt
. (7)
We are now in a position to use the convenient exponential distribution
to further characterize the BGP. Let g be the constant growth rate of N, and
C¯ be the constant value of C. Substituting (1) into (3) yields
C¯
L
= N0egte−λq
∗
t , (8)
i.e.
q∗t = a+ gt/λ,
with
a =
1
λ
ln
µ
N0L
C¯
¶
.
Next, we have that T (q) = λg (q − a). Substituting this and (2) into (6),
computing the integrals and rearranging, yields
Vt =
(p− 1)L
r
e−λq
∗
t
∙
r
r + g
¸
,
which, after substituting (8) is simply equal to
Vt =
p− 1
r + g
C¯
Nt
. (9)
Intuituively, this formula tells us that future profits have to be discounted
at a higher rate, the higher the growth rate, as faster growth speeds obsoles-
cence. This is the usual "creative destruction" eﬀect.
To compute the equilibrium growth rate, we eliminate Vt between (9) and
(7) and then use (5) to eliminate C¯. We get
(p− 1) (γL− g)
r + g
= 1,
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i.e.
g =
(p− 1) γL− r
p
. (10)
As in other endogenous growth models, growth depends positively on
the monopoly markup (p − 1)/p, on the productivity of research γ, on the
economy’s size L, and negatively on the discount rate r.
3 ‘Random’ search engines
In the preceding model, consumers encounter no frictions when looking for
the highest quality goods. As the number of goods grows, they consume the
same absolute number of goods. Hence the fraction of the total number of
available goods that they consume falls over time and converges to zero.
If frictions are present in locating the high quality goods, we expect the
analysis to be changed. We also expect the technology or locating goods —
the search engine — to have an eﬀect on growth. In what follows we analyse
the impact of that technology on economic growth.
In this section, we start with two very simple search engines. These
are "random" in that neither the quality of the good nor the inputs into
the search process matter. Thus they are rather thought of as simple search
frictions rather than search engines. Nevertheless analyzing themwill provide
us with useful benchmark.
3.1 Constant hit probability
The first search engine that we consider is a "constant hit probability" one.
That is, consumers are able to locate a good with some constant probability
ρ < 1. As the economy grows, the number of "hits" that consumers get
increases proportionally to the total number of goods. The greater ρ, the
greater the eﬃciency of the search engine. The preceding model where all
goods are reachable corresponds to the special case where ρ = 1.
How is the analysis modified when ρ < 1? In (3), the total pool of goods
from which a consumer can consume now has a mass equal to ρNt. Thus we
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now have instead of (3),
Ct
L
= ρNt(1− F (q∗t )). (11)
With our exponential distribution, that is equivalent to
C¯
L
= ρN0egte−λq
∗
t , (12)
For a given Ct and Nt, q∗t is lower, the lower ρ : consumers are now less
selective as they can access fewer goods.
The other equation which is changed is (6). As before, a good with quality
q becomes obsolete at T (q) such that q∗T (q) = q. Until that date, its producer
reaches only a fraction ρ of consumers. Thus for u < T (q) its profit is now
(p− 1)ρL. Equation (6) must then be modified as follows:
Vt =
ÃZ +∞
q∗t
f(q)
Z T (q)
t
e−r(u−t)du
!
(p− 1)ρL. (13)
Let us again compute the growth rate in a BGP. Using (12), we see that
the evolution of q∗t is now
q∗t = a
0 + gt/λ,
with
a0 =
1
λ
ln
µ
ρN0L
C¯
¶
.
Thus T (q) = (q − a0)λ/g. The same computations as above now yield
Vt = e−λq
∗
t
∙
ρ(p− 1)L
r + g
¸
=
p− 1
r + g
C¯
Nt
.
Using again (7) and (5) we find that the growth rate is independent of ρ
and again given by (10).
Therefore, the eﬃciency of search has no eﬀect the growth rate. It does
aﬀect welfare, though, since a lower ρ reduces the average quality of goods
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being consumed, which harms consumers. But this is a level eﬀect, not a
growth eﬀect.
Growth is unchanged when ρ changes because two conflicting eﬀects can-
cel each other. On the one hand, firms get a lower share of consumers when ρ
falls. On the other hand, they expect to stay longer in business as consumers
are less selective.
3.2 Constant number of hits
We now move to the other extreme and consider a random search friction
such that each consumer gets a constant number of hits K.
The relationship between the threshold quality level and total consump-
tion at t now no longer depends on the total number of goods Nt, since an
increase in that number does not raise the number of goods that consumers
can access:
Ct
L
= K(1− F (q∗t )). (14)
As the number of goods grows relative to the number of hits, the mar-
ket share of each goods falls with time as its chances of being located fall.
The probability of being located at date t is K/Nt. Therefore, the PDV of
introducing a new good at t is now given by
Vt =
ÃZ +∞
q∗t
f(q)
Z T (q)
t
K
Nu
e−r(u−t)du
!
(p− 1)L. (15)
In a balanced growth path, Ct is constant, and so is q∗t : The obsolescence
process is shut down and T (q) = +∞. Integrating (15), we find that
Vt =
K(p− 1)Le−λq∗t
(r + g)Nt
.
Using the same steps as above we can show again that the growth rate is
independent of K and still given by (10).
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While growth is strictly positive, utility does not grow as consumers see
the same number of goods and do not get more selective over time. It is prof-
itable to introduce new products because they "steal" business from existing
ones, but a central planner would allocate all ressources to production and
none to innovation.
The two polar cases we have just discussed can be generalized by assuming
a time-varying probability ρt of locating a good. In Appendix 1, it is shows
that if ρt decreases exponentially over time, the equilibrium growth rate is
given by (10) and is therefore independent of both the level and rate of decay
of ρt.
4 Popularity
I now study the impact on growth of a search engine which rewards quality.
Clearly, any redistribution of hits away from low-quality goods and in favor of
high-quality goods will typically improve welfare. However, I am assuming
that the only way for the search engine to reward quality is by gradually
observing some measure of the popularity of a web site. Popularity builds
up over time gradually, and there is a trade-oﬀ: The more the search engine
wants to reward quality,the more it must rely on popularity which gives more
hits to old goods relative to new goods at any given quality level. If on the
other hand the search engine wants to reduce the advantage of older goods
it can only do so at the cost of making the number of hits less sensitive to
quality.
I represent this trade-oﬀ by assuming that a good has a ‘score’ given by
the following function
πt(q, s) = ρ(1− ke−ε(q−q
∗
t ))(1− e−α(t−s)).
This score is the probability of being located by a consumer. In the
preceding formula, t is the current date, q is the quality of the good, s is
the date at which the good was introduced, and q∗t is the threshold quality
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at t, as in the preceding analysis. The structure of the search engine is then
characterized by four parameters: ρ, k, ε and α.
• ρ is a measure of the overall eﬃciency of the search engine. An increase
in ρ increases the number of hits proportionally for all goods. For
convenience I assume ρ < 1.
• α is the speed of convergence to the target level of hits, which reflects
the fact that it takes time to build popularity. The higher α, the lower
the popularity advantage of older goods over newer goods.
• ε is the sensitivity of the target level of hits to quality. The higher ε,
the greater the number of hits of the higher quality sites over the lower
quality sites.
• k is a weight which captures the importance of quality; it will be treated
as a fixed parameter.
Note that quality enters not in absolute terms, but relative to the mar-
ginally obsolete quality q∗t . This is mostly for convenience (it helps ensuring
the existence of a balanced growth path), but it also captures the idea that
popularity is a relative concept. A given good introduced at a given time
gets fewer hits if consumers are more selective.
We model the trade-oﬀ discussed above by assuming that it is not possi-
ble to increase the speed of convergence α without reducing the sensitivity
to quality ε. Thus we assume that these two parameters must satisfy the
following constraint:
α+ bε ≤ δ.
How does such an engine aﬀect the growth rate? In a balanced growth
path with growth rate g, at any date t the density of birth dates for goods of
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any quality is given by geg(s−t). Thus the average score of a good with quality
q is given by
πt(q) =
Z t
−∞
geg(s−t)πt(q, s)ds
=
αρ
g + α
(1− ke−ε(q−q∗t )).
Consumers can only access a fraction πt(q) of goods of quality q. Their
threshold level is therefore determined by
Ct
L
= Nt
Z +∞
q∗t
πt(q)f(q)dq
= Nte−λq
∗
t
αρ
g + α
(1− λk
λ+ ε
). (16)
The next step is to compute the value of innovation. A good of quality q
introduced at date t yields a present discounted value equal to
Rt(q) = (p− 1)Lρ
Z T (q)
t
e−r(u−t)(1− ke−ε(q−q∗u))(1− e−α(u−t))du.
In a balanced growth path, Ct is again constant and q∗t grows linearly
over time:
q∗t = a
00 + gt/λ,
a00 =
1
λ
ln
µ
ρN0L
C¯
α
g + α
(1− λk
λ+ ε
)
¶
.
This allows us to compute Rt(q) by straightforward integration. We even-
tually get
Rt(q) = (p− 1)Lρ
⎡
⎣
1−e−rλ(q−q
∗
t )/g
r −
k
r−εg/λ
³
e−ε(q−q
∗
t ) − e−
rλ
g (q−q
∗
t )
´
−1−e−(r+α)λ(q−q
∗
t )/g
r+α +
k
r+α−εg/λ
³
e−ε(q−q
∗
t ) − e−
(r+α)λ
g (q−q
∗
t )
´ ⎤⎦(17)
= (p− 1)Lρ
" α
r(r+α) −
kα
(r−εg/λ)(r+α−εg/λ)e
−ε(q−q∗t )
+εg/λ−(1−k)rr(r−εg/λ) e
−rλ(q−q∗t )/g − εg/λ−(1−k)(r+α)
(r+α)(r+α−εg/λ)e
− (r+α)λg (q−q
∗
t )
#
.
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The expected value of an innovation is equal to
Vt =
Z +∞
q∗t
Rt(q)f(q)dq (18)
= e−λq
∗
t (p− 1)ρLH(g),
where H(g) is a function that can be computed by direct integration of (17),
yielding
H(g) =
α
r(r + α)
− λkα
(r − εg/λ)(r + α− εg/λ)(λ+ ε) +
εg − λ(1− k)r
r(r − εg/λ)(λ+ rλ/g)
− εg − λ(1− k)(r + α)
(r + α)(r + α− εg/λ)(λ+ (r + α)λ/g) .
This formula can be considerably simplified and we get
H(g) =
α
(r + g)(r + g + α)
µ
1− λk
λ+ ε
¶
. (19)
The derivation of the equilibrium growth rate is then similar as in the
preceding sections. We substitute (16) into (18) and use (7) to get
(p− 1)H(g)C¯ (g + α)(λ+ ε)
α(λ(1− k) + ε) = 1/γ.
We then eliminate C¯ using (5) and then substitute (19) to get2
(p− 1)(γL− g) = (r + g)(r + g + α)
g + α
. (20)
This condition determines the equilibrium growth rate. The only para-
meter of the search engine which aﬀects the growth rate is α, the speed of
convergence to the target hit level.
Thus, an engine which is more sensitive to quality — i.e. a higher ε — has
no eﬀect on growth. The reason is again the trade-oﬀ between selectivity
and visibility: while innovators know that they are more likely to sell if their
good has a higher quality, which is captured by the term in
¡
1− λkλ+ε
¢
in
2We can check that for α→∞ and k → 0 this condition boils down to (10).
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(19), that is oﬀset by the associated increase in q∗, as captured by the same
term in (16), which makes it less likely that they are selected by consumers
given their quality, since consumers have an easier access to higher quality
goods. The two eﬀects again exactly cancel each other when the net eﬀect
on growth is computed.
Why does then αmatters? The same visibility/selectivity trade-oﬀ comes
into play when α is increased. However, in (16) α enters through the term
α
g+α . That expression is proportional to the average probability of getting a
hit across firms in a balanced growth path, which is what is relevant for the
consumers’ selection decision. The greater that number, the more selective
the consumers and the greater q∗. On the other hand, the corresponding
term in (19) is αr+g+α , which captures the fact that from the point of view
of an innovator, the benefits of convergence are future and therefore subject
to discounting. As a result, an increase in α has a stronger eﬀect on the
an innovator’s present discounted profit than on the consumer’s selection
decision, because the benefits of visibility come sooner.
The result is that the equilibrium growth rate is increasing in α. This is
illustrated on Figure 1, which plots the LHS of (20) against its RHS. The LHS
must cross the RHS from above if the equilibrium has to be locally stable.3
An increase in α unambiguously lowers the RHS, so that the economy grows
faster. Note that the eﬀect becomes nil at r = 0, since α then disappears
from the RHS of (20).
5 Advertising
In this section I consider a radically diﬀerent search engine. In the previous
example firms were passive and could not aﬀect the number of hits that they
get. This is what would happen if firms were posting ’candid’ web pages
that reflect the true quality of their product. I now assume that instead
the number of hits that they get depends on the resources they spend on
3Otherwise, an small increase in growth would increase profits in such a way that one
would innovate more, so that growth would increase further.
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advertising. This can capture two phenomena:
• Direct spending on advertising, say to appear on the right panel of
google
• Manipulating one’s web page to make it more friendly to the engine
(e.g. google bombs, inclusion of popular search terms, etc)
I assume that while these strategies increase visibility, consumers still
observe the true quality of the good once they have located the web page.
Thus they cannot erroneously buy a low quality good.
Clearly, innovators who come up with higher quality goods will have
want to invest more in their web page, because they expect to stay longer in
business4.
I formalize these ideas as follows. When a good is introduced, a firm
spends s units of labor investing in the visibility of its web page. Its score is
then given by
π(σ) = 2ασ0.5 + ρ.
The parameters ρ and α capture the design of the search engine. The
greater α, the more sensitive the search engine to the firm’s investment.
While R and D is undertaken prior to observing the quality of the good
that will be invented, advertising decisions are made after that is observed.
Therefore, denoting again by T (q) the obsolescence date of a good with
quality q, a firm entering the market at date s sets σ so as to maximize
max
σ
π(σ)(p− 1)L
Z T (q)
s
e−r(u−s)du− σ
The optimal σ is
σ(q, s) =
µ
α(p− 1)L1− e
−r(T (q)−s)
r
¶2
. (21)
4Alternatively, one could spend more resources ex-ante at the R and D stage so as to
make it more likely that the resulting good is of high quality. This would bring us back
to the models of directed innovation as studied by Acemoglu (1998).
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The corresponding score is thus constant through the life of the good and
equal to5
π(q, s) = 2α2(p− 1)L1− e
−r(T (q)−s)
r
+ ρ
The resulting present discounted profit is equal to
Rt(q) =
µ
α(p− 1)L1− e
−r(T (q)−t)
r
¶2
+ ρ(p− 1)L1− e
−r(T (q)−t)
r
. (22)
At any date t, the average score of a good with quality q is in steady state
given by
πt(q) =
Z t
−∞
geg(s−t)π(q, s)ds
=
2α2(p− 1)L
r
+ ρ− 2α
2(p− 1)Lg
r(g + r)
e−r(T (q)−t). (23)
In equilibrium, the growth rate is given by
g = γ(L− Ct −Mt), (24)
where
Mt = N˙t
Z +∞
q∗t
σ(q, t)f(q)dq (25)
is total employment in advertising.
The cut-oﬀ quality level is determined by
Ct
L
= Nt
Z +∞
q∗t
πt(q)f(q)dq. (26)
To compute the growth rate, we need again to derive a formula for the
value of an innovation. Since C and M must be constant in a balanced
growth path, it is easy to see that q∗t is again aﬃne in t
5This will always be lower than 1 provided α2 6 (1− ρ) ∗ r/(2(p− 1)L).
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q∗t = a
000 +
g
λ
t.
Consequently, T (q)− t = λg (q−q∗t ), which we can substitute into (22) and
we then have that
Vt =
Z +∞
q∗t
Rt(q)f(q)dq
= e−λq
∗
t
(p− 1)L
r + g
∙
ρ+ 2α2(p− 1)L 1
2r + g
¸
. (27)
Substituting (23) into (26) and integrating yields
Ct
L
= Nte−λq
∗
t
∙
ρ+ 2α2(p− 1)L r + 2g
(r + g)2
¸
, (28)
implying, in particular, that
a000 =
1
λ
ln
µ
N0L
C¯
µ
ρ+ 2α2(p− 1)L r + 2g
(r + g)2
¶¶
. (29)
Eliminating e−λq
∗
t between (27) and (28) and using (7) again, we get
1
γ
=
(p− 1)C¯
r + g
"
ρ+ 2α
2(p−1)L
2r+g
ρ+ 2α
2(p−1)L(r+2g)
(r+g)2
#
(30)
To compute C¯ we first compute the steady state level of advertising M¯
by using (25). Substituting (21) into (25) and integrating, we get
M¯ = gNte−λq
∗
t
α2(p− 1)2L2
r2
µ
1− rg
(r + g)(2r + g)
¶
(31)
Substituting (28) into (31) and then reporting the resulting expression
along with (30) into (24) we eventually get an equation which determines
the equilibrium growth rate:
pg + r − γL(p− 1) = ηH1(g), (32)
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where
η =
α2
ρ
and H1(g) is a function determined by
H1(g) = −2(p− 1)L
r + 2g
r + g
+ (p− 1)2L
∙
2γL
2r + g
− g
r
µ
2r − g
2r + g
+
g + r
r
¶¸
.
(33)
It can be shown straightforwardly that H 01(g) < 0, therefore there exists
a unique solution to (32).6 Furthermore, the parameters of the search engine
only enter through the ratio η, and it multiplies the RHS of (32). The equi-
librium growth rate g∗ increases (resp. falls) with η if and only if H1(g∗) > 0
(resp. H1(g∗) < 0). We can show7 that H1(g∗) < 0, therefore a search en-
gine which is more elastic to the innovator’s search input always reduces the
long-run growth rate of the economy.
What is the intuition? As shown by (27), given the selectivity level q∗t , an
increase in the search sensitivity parameter α increases the value of the firm,
as firms take advantage of the possibility to advertise more should they come
up with a higher quality product (the profit eﬀect). However, this increased
advertising eﬀort is oﬀset by the consumer’s greater selectivity, as shown in
(28) (the selectivity eﬀect). The weight of α2 relative to ρ in (28) is r+2g
(r+g)2 , to
be compared with 1
2r+g in (27), which is lower. This means that selectivity
increases relatively more than the direct eﬀect of advertising on the value of
6We have H 01(g) = − 2γL(2r+g)2 −
1
r
2r−g
2r+g − 2
g
r2 +
4g
(2r+g)2 −
2(p−1)L
(r+g)2 .
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for H 01(g) < 0 is 4g < 2γL +
1
r ((2r − g) (2r + g) +
2gr (2r + g)
2)
= 2γL+ 1r (4r
2 − g2 + 8rg + 8g2 + 2g
3
r )
= 2γL+ 4r + 8g + 7g2/r + 2g3/r2.
This last expression clearly exceeds 4g.
7To see this, let A(g) = 2 (p−1)L(r+2g)r+g +
(p−1)2L
r2 g(1−
rg
(r+g)(2r+g) ) and B(g) = 2
(p−1)L
2r+g <
A(g)
Call gˆ the root of the LHS of (32);gˆ = (p−1)γL−rp .
Note that H1(g) = B(g)(p− 1)(γL− g)− (r + g)A(g).
We have that H1(gˆ) < B(gˆ)((p− 1)(γL− gˆ)− (r + gˆ)) = 0.
Therefore, one must have g∗ < gˆ. Since the LHS of (32) is increasing in g, it follows that
both sides must be negative at g∗.
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the firm when α goes up. The end result is a net reduction in that value and
lower incentives to innovate.
This is due to a rather subtle mechanism. The selectivity eﬀect is driven
by the eﬀect of the engine’s design on the total number of hits (or total score
of all firms). The larger that total score, the more selective the firms given
C, and the higher q∗. The firm’s revenue is less sensitive to α, relative to
ρ, than its score, because when α goes up, so does σ. This eﬀect increases
advertising costs, which dampens the increase in revenues. On the other
hand, an increase in ρ has no impact on the search intensity, so that this cost
deduction eﬀect is not present.8 This explains why, as compared to its score,
a firm’s revenue is less elastic to α relative to ρ. Consequently, the selectivity
eﬀect dominates the profit eﬀect.
In addition to this net eﬀect on the incentives to innovate, the increased
employment in advertising reduces the human resources available for innova-
tion which has a direct negative eﬀect on the equilibrium growth rate. This is
apparent from (31) whose RHS increases with α, which yields a lower growth
rate in (24) for any value of C.
6 Welfare
The preceding examples do not exhibit trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent dimen-
sions of the search engine in terms of long-run growth. The reason is that
many of these parameters only have levels eﬀect on the number of goods,
not growth eﬀects. But these levels eﬀects are relevant when one looks at
welfare. In this section, I derive the expression for welfare and discuss how
it is aﬀected by the design of the search engine.
One should note that in this class of models, the functional form of the
value of quality ω(q) matters. In particular, for most specifications, the
8This is further compounded by a discount eﬀect: At any date t, there are firms of
high quality that were created much before t. While current profits weighed little in their
decision to innovate because of discounting, they advertised their web page a lot and still
generate many hits, thus increasing current selectivity substantially.
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optimal growth rate will depend on the initial value of N, N0, meaning that
the optimal growth path is not a balanced growth path. To avoid these
complications, I assume that ω() is an exponential:
ω(q) = eωq, ω < λ.
The utility flow at t is then given by
Ut = Nt
Z +∞
q∗t
πt(q)f(q)eωqdq, (34)
where πt(q) is the average score of goods with quality q.We can now compute
total utility (the PDV of Ut) and we do so in both the popularity model and
the advertising model.
6.1 The popularity model
We have seen that in the popularity model,
πt(q) =
αρ
g + α
(1− ke−ε(q−q∗t )).
We then get that
Ut = N0egte−(λ−ω)q
∗
t
αρ
g + α
∙
λ
λ− ω − k
λ
λ+ ε− ω
¸
.
Total utility is then
U¯ =
Z +∞
0
Ute−rtdt
=
αρ
g + α
∙
λ
λ− ω − k
λ
λ+ ε− ω
¸
N0
e−(λ−ω)a00
r − gω/λ.
Using the derivations of Section 4 to compute a00, we get9
9We have that C¯ = L − g/γ = (r+g)(r+g+α)γ(p−1)(g+α) and therefore a00 =
1
λ ln(
ρN0Lα
(g+α)(L−g/γ)
³
1− λkλ+ε
´
).
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U¯ =
λ
λ− ω
(L− g/γ)1−ω/λ
L(r − gω/λ)
1− k λ−ωλ+ε−ω¡
1− λkλ+ε
¢1−ω/λ ∙ρN0L αg + α
¸ω/λ
.
This formula shows that utility varies in a non monotonic fashion with
α (both through the terms in α and the terms in g), and also goes up with
ε.10 Thus in the zone where U¯ goes up with α there is a trade-oﬀ between
increasing ε — making the search engine more sensitive to popularity — and
increasing α — increasing the speed at which firms converge to their target
score.
6.2 The advertising model
To compute welfare in the advertising model, we now use (23) and substitute
it into (34). We get
Ut = Ut = N0egte−(λ−ω)q
∗
t
∙
λ
λ− ω
µ
ρ+
2α2(p− 1)L
r
¶
− 2α
2(p− 1)L
r(r + g)
g2
λ
λg + λr − ωg
¸
Next, we have
U¯ =
Z +∞
0
Ute−rtdt
=
λ
λ− ω
∙
ρ+
2α2(p− 1)L
(r + g)
r + 2g − ωg/λ
r + g − ωg/λ
¸
N0
e−(λ−ω)a000
r − gω/λ
And finally, subsituting the value of a000 from (29) while using (30):
U¯ =
λ
λ− ω (
r + g
(p− 1)γL)
1−ω/λ
h
ρ+ 2α
2(p−1)L
(r+g)
r+2g−ωg/λ
r+g−ωg/λ
i
h
ρ+ 2α
2(p−1)L
2r+g
i1−ω/λ Nω/λ0 .
10Let Z =
1−k λ−ωλ+ε−ω
(1− λkλ+ε)
1−ω/λ =
³
1− k 1−z1−z+x
´³
1− k1+x
´z−1
, with z = ω/λ and x = ε/λ.
d lnZ/dx = k(1−z)/(1−z+x)
2
1−k(1−z)/(1−z+x) −
k(1−z)/(1+x)2
1−k/(1+x)
∝ 1(1−z+x)2−k(1−z)(1−z+x) −
1
(1+x)2−k(1+x) , and it can be checked that this expression is
>0, since z > 0 and the quantity (1−z+x)2−k(1−z)(1−z+x) is a decreasing function
of z.
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While this expression is not tractable, numerical simulations (see Appen-
dix II) suggest that for low values of ω, U¯ is a decreasing function of α.
This makes sense, since at ω = 0 consumers do not value quality and their
utility is just C¯rL , the PDV of per capita consumption. This falls with α
since advertising crowds out production of goods when α goes up. As ω, the
preference for quality, goes up, U¯ becomes U-shaped in α. Furthermore, its
upward sloping portion is steeper and delivers higher values of U¯ relative to
its level at α = 0, the greater ω. Consequently, for ω large enough consumers
end up preferring the highest possible value of α, everything else equal, while
they prefer α = 0 for lower values of ω.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have studied a model of growth through selection of higher
quality goods which is suited to analyze the role of search engines. The model
has been applied to two specific search engines: one which rewards popularity
as it gradually builds up over time, another which rewards ex-ante investment
in advertising.
This is obviously a first step which opens the door for many variants and
extensions. In particular, the modelling of search engines could be enriched
to take into account ranking of hits, commercial links, etc. On the consumer
side, one may want to introduce heterogeneity in tastes, an endogenous con-
sumer search eﬀort, and limited cognitive capacity in handling hits.
So far, the use of the model is so far only normative, since I look at the
eﬀects of the search engine on growth ans welfare. The model can potentially
be used to endogenize the structure of the search engine(s) by specifying an
adequate objective function and a competitive environment for this type of
business. The resulting equilibrium design can then be compared to the one
that maximizes growth or welfare.
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APPENDIX I
A time-varying random hit probability.
I assume that the score of any firm at t is now
ρt = ρ0e
−ηt.
In steady state, we must have
C¯
L
= ρ0N0e
gte−λq
∗
t e−ηt. (35)
Therefore,
q∗t = a
0000 + (g − η)t/λ,
where
a0000 =
1
λ
ln
µ
ρ0N0L
C¯
¶
.
The value of an innovation is
Vt =
ÃZ +∞
q∗t
f(q)
Z T (q)
t
ρue
−r(u−t)dudq
!
(p− 1)L
= e−ηt
ÃZ +∞
q∗t
λe−λqρ0
1− e−(r+η)(T (q)−t)
r + η
dq
!
(p− 1)L
=
e−ηt(p− 1)Le−λq∗t
r + η
ρ0
Ã
1−
Z +∞
q∗t
λe−λ(q−q
∗
t )e−λ
r+η
g−η (q−q
∗
t )dq
!
=
e−ηt(p− 1)Le−λq∗t
r + g
ρ0
=
(p− 1)C¯
Nt(r + g)
,
and the rest of the analysis follows as in Section 3, yielding the same
equilibrium growth rate.
APPENDIX II
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Numerical computations of growth and welfare in the advertising model.
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c represent the evolution of the consumer’s present
discounted utility U¯ as a function of α for ω = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively.
These simulations were run for ρ = 0.5, λ = 1, L = 1, γ = 0.1, r = 0.05, p = 2.
The GAUSS source file for generating these simulations is:
library pgraph;
output file = results.asc reset;
screen oﬀ;
ro=0.5;
la=1;
ll=1;
ga=0.1;
r=0.05;
p=2;
om=0.3;
for i(1,100,1);
al=i/100;
gs=solve();
q1=ro+2*al^2*(p-1)*ll/(r+gs)*(r+2*gs-om*gs/la)/(r+ga-om*gs/la);
q2=ro+2*al^2*(p-1)*ll/(2*r+gs);
ubar=la/(la-om)*((r+gs)/(p-1)/ga/ll)^(1-om/la)*q1/q2^(1-om/la);
print al gs ubar;
endfor;
output oﬀ;
screen on;
stop;
proc h1(g);
local s;
s=0;
s=s-2*(p-1)*ll*(r+2*g)/(r+g);
s=s+(p-1)*ll*(2*ga*ll/(2*r+g)-(g/r)*((2*r-g)/(2*r+g)+(g+r)/r));
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retp(s);
endp;
proc funct(g);
retp(p*g+r-ga*ll*(p-1)-al^2/ro*h1(g));
endp;
proc solve();
local i0,i1,i2,t;
if funct(0)>0;
retp(0);
endif;
i0=0;
i1=ga*ll;
do until abs(i0-i1)<0.0000001;
i2=(i0+i1)/2;
t=funct(i2);
if t>0;
i1=i2;
else;
i0=i2;
endif;
endo;
retp(i2);
endp;
end;
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